I was given a military study booklet from a co-worker who I became good friends with and I had later learned that he had moved here from the United States and he had served in the US Military, with an anti-aircraft missile unit in Florida, and as he was in the US Military he had been given this handbook.  He had told me that he had found this book at his house and as the material was unclassified I was able to view the material, and he had asked if I would want the book because he was not in the military any more, and he had no need for the book anymore and he knew I was big into airplanes, so I had said I would take it off his hands and one day at work he handed me the book and I brought it home and browsed through the book and was impressed with the material.

As I have not served in the military, I was really interested in the kind of information that was contained in the book. 

Here is a list of the contents within this book

 

Chapter 1 - Need for Visual Aircraft Recognition

Chapter 2 - Factors That Affect Detection and Recognition

Chapter 3 - Description of Aircraft

Chapter 4 - Instruction Program

Chapter 5 - Ground Attack, Close Air Support, and Fighter-Bomber Aircraft

Chpater 6 - Air Superiority and Interceptor Aircraft

Chapter 7 - Bomber Aircraft

Chapter 8 -  Cargo and Transport Aircraft

Chapter 9 -  Utility Aircraft

Chapter 10 - Helicopter Aircraft

Chapter 11 - Early Warning, Observation, and Reconnaissance Aircraft

 

Appendix    -   Master Aircraft List

Glossary     -   Obviously,  a glossary.

References -   

 

This is a very interesting book and if you can find yourself a copy of this handbook I am sure for those of you  who are as interested in military aircraft as I am, this book would be pretty much a bible for you.

 

 

The once mighty British Royal Air Force Base at Warton, home of major elements of the British Royal Air Force during World War II, is now a development and testing facility for the BAE System Corporation, the last of Great Britain’s biggest aircraft design and developmental companies. Warton’s runways had been proving ground for some of Britain’s greatest aircrafts of the last four decades. The venerable close-support bomber Canberra, the Lightning, the BAE’s Hawk and the Panavia’s Tornado fighter-bomber, all first took to the air from Warton’s runways. The final Tornado left Warton in the summer of 1998, a GR1 model whose destiny would be the Royal Saudi Air Force.  These days Warton is used for several of purposes by the Royal Air Force. Part of the base is being designated to be the final assembly stop for Europe’s next generation air-superiority fighter, the Typhoon.

 

The Base also accommodates major elements of Britain’s air defense system. Warton would be the home of the two initially deployed Typhoon squadrons, the No. 29 and No. 17, in Britain. In addition, Warton was utilized as test bed for the newly improved Nimrod MRA4 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Eventually the Nimrod would be based at RAF Kinloss Base in Moray. But the base main function in Britain’s aircraft development is that of a testing facility for new technology. The current technology being tested at Warton is rumored to be England’s first true and indigenous Stealth Airplane.

 

Between the years 1992 and 1994, the British government invested the amount of 100 million pounds in research the feasibility of developing a workable stealth fighter program. Fallowing the recommendations of a formal feasibility study in early 1997, BAE urged the government in London to start a crash-course program for the design and production of Britain’s first stealth plane. This generates the first recorded data about a stealth program in the UK. The idea, as rumor has it, is that Great Britain, having observed the low operational capability of its Tornado fleet in Desert Storm (1991), decided that a replacement, stealth fighter was needed to maintain air superiority over non-power dominated areas. Late in 1992, it was reported by some media outlets that the RAF was hard at work fielding a Stealth Technology Demonstrator Aircraft that should had been ready by the end of the 1990s.

 

It’s known that RAF second generation Tornados had been testing Radar Absorbing Materials since the middle of 1991. HALO, or High Altitude Low Observables, is the name assign by many to Britain’s effort to develop and produce a front-line stealth fighter-bomber. Most aviation experts believe that the HALO program closely resembled that of the United States Navy’s A-12 Stealth Bomber. The program was “officially” canceled in the mid 1990s. All of this is in the background of “small silver flying triangle” sightings all over the southern coast of England since 2000. Can Britain be in the mist of developing an indigenous stealth platform?

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The concept of an Anti Aircraft Artillery guns was not even in the imagination of field commanders in the early part of the Twenty Century. Aviation was a new field of battle then. A much misunderstood one also. But, as with any new human-developed field, there were countermeasure being develop almost at the same time that the first few planes took to the air. As in the case with many war-related innovations, Germany took the lead in this new area. Between 1908 and 09, Germany demonstrate it that an effective AAA system could be achieved with the available weapon systems. The first rudimentary "Balloon Guns", as they were then referred to; were developed by either the vaunted Krupp Corporation or the Rheinmetall Group. These pieces were basically a field gun modified to fire at a higher angle mounted on a truck. At the same time, Germany began to encircle its biggest cities with field artillery pieces turned through 360 degrees. These pieces were placed on static angles mounts which enabled them to fire at a higher angle. At the time of the eruption of the Great War, there were so few airplanes available to either side that the development of AAA systems were relegated to the bottom of every nation’s military budget. On those days, weapons budgetary assignments usually went to the Army and Navy. In the case of an Army for example, those funds were use to develop advance armored vehicles, more powerful field and machine guns as well as heavy mortars mainly designed for siege operations.

In August 1914, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had only a handful of rudimentary AAA guns on towed mounts. The French were even less prepare with only two modified De Dion Bouton cars fitted with a high angled field gun. The main British AAA gun of the war was the 13th Pounder. The system was a combination of a 13th pounder light field gun mounted on Thornycroft J-type automobile which was one of the most strange-looking vehicles of the entire war. The J-types were fitted with stabilizers and screw jacks in order to prevent the guns’ recoil from overturning the vehicle. Usually, the British will deploy two of those systems accompanied by two other vehicles for the crew, range finding equipment and ammunition. The first of those 13th Pounders began to appear on the Western Front in the summer of 1915. Meanwhile, the French began to use their famous 75 mm field gun in the anti aircraft role, mostly because the gun’s high firing rate. The 75 mm AAA concept was a very simple one. One of such guns was mounted on top of a De Dion automobile fitted with several stabilizers for recoil absorption.

	British 13th Pounder Gun	French 75 mm AAA Gun
Shell Weight:	13lb	15.8lb
Gun Weight:	2,150lb	8,800lb
Elevation:	+80 degrees	+70 degrees
Vertical Range:	13,100’	15,500’
Muzzle Velocity:	1,700’/second	1,740’/second

The French 75 mm gun was extensively use on all fronts by the Allies. In fact, when the first daylight bombings of London commenced in the summer of 1915, the British acquired some of these weapons in an effort to bolster their capital city’s air defenses.

The main problem facing AAA operators was the targeting of, although slow moving, a three dimensional object. At the beginning, the gun was fired directly at the aircraft but by the time the shell arrived at the right altitude, the target would had move on. Gunners began to mitigate this problem by mounting complex sights on all of their weapons. Unfortunately for the gunners, this only duplicated the batteries’s efforts. It was then found simple enough to fit one, centralized sight positioned in the middle of a battery of guns. Once the crew had managed the data related to the height, range and speed of an incoming object; this was passed on to individual targeting gunners who will calibrate its guns towards the target.

It is almost impossible to achieve a reliable figure of the number of downed aircraft by those rudimentary AAA system, but is fair to say the number was a very low one. However, conclusive evidence has shown that AAA-generated fire did altered German reconnaissance patters in the later stages of the war.@

After more than three years of bloody fighting, The German High Command came up with a plan aimed at ending the crippling stalemate on the dreaded Western Front. Planning for Germany’s vaunted Spring of 1918 Offensive were well underway when the human carnage known as The Third Battle of Ypres ended in November 1917. The Battle, another senseless encounter where neither side were able to grab a decisively advantage, had the effect of pushing German leaders into an strategy which was tactical sound but strategically deficient. In the end, the "German Spring Offensive" of 1918, failed miserable hastening with it the fall of Imperial Germany. More than ninety years after, the Offensive still exert a continuing fascination for those interested in the history of great battles. To date historians have concentrated on describing the Offensive from an almost exclusively ground prospective, thus ignoring one of the most important component of the effort: the air aspect. Following 3rd Ypres, a relative lull in air activity descended on the whole Western Front as each: the French, British and Germans commenced preparations for the next phase of the war. For the Germans, the path to victory was narrowing by the day. Meanwhile, for the Western Allies, victory was near. Time was the issue. Time and the arriving of the fresh American combat divisions.

On July 1917, Germany’s Imperial Air Service established the concept of Jagdgeschwader (JG) which literally means "Hunting Wings" under the direction of the world’s most famous combat ace, Manfred von Richthofen. The introduction and eventual success of such a radical formation was another prove of Richthofen’s mastery of strategic warfare. As more and more German aircrafts became operational, more Jagdgeschwader were formed. On February 1918 JG-2 and JG-3 were created. Both "wings" were manned by Jastas. JG-2 was compromised by Jastas 12, 13, 15 and 19; while JG-3 utilized Jastas 2, 26, 27 and 36. Jastas was the name assigned to one of the most venerable aircraft ever to take to the air: the amazing Fokker Dr.I. The Dr.I triplane was the staple of the powerful German Air Force during the later stages of the war. Introduced to operational services on October 1917, the famous rotary engined triplane was a extremely maneuverable combat platform in the hands of an experimented pilot. Although glorified trough history, the reality was that the Dr.I was obsolete almost before it entered the front lines. Its overall service career was marked by an endless string of mechanical failures and accidents, nevermind the fact that they were increasingly becoming easy pray for the newest Allied "pursuit" or fighter airplanes just arriving in France. Nevertheless, in the hands of such aces as Richthofen and Werner Voss, the Dr.I proved to be a dangerous adversary. Unfortunately for the Germans, by the end of 1917, the small number of Dr.I built, just 320 units, and the attrition rate suffered by the units were forcing the Germans to look for new options.

Armed with potent fighters, both JG formations would be instrumental to Germany’s strategy that spring. JG-2 was over the overall command of Rudolf Berthold, while JG-3 felt into the lap of the well respected Bruno Loerer. At the same time the Jagdgeschwader were becoming operational, a new, more flexible formation was being assembled. Consisting of no more than up to three Jastas, the Jagdgruppe was a flight envelop designed and formed only on the tactical level. In short terms, the Jagdgruppe was a transit unit formed to accomplish a dedicated task during an engagement. From January to November 1918, twelve of these tactical attacks units were assembled (Number 1 trough 12). As the same time the new formations were commencing to take shape in November 1917, the German government promptly began to search for a new and improved fighter aircraft to relive the Dr.I. One that could take on the best Allied fighter. Air trials were held on January of the following year with the Fokker D VII as the undisputed winner. The D VII was, without question, the best develop fighter of World War I. The concept of the VII was simple enough. In order to recapture the air supremacy Germany’s one enjoyed, the Air Service needed to be outfitted with the most powerful fighter available. The VII meet and surpassed those lofty expectations. The German High Command was so impressed with the new deign that they placed an immediate order for four hundred units. At the time, the order was Fokker’s largest single venture, easy eclipsing the previous record held by the purchasing of sixty Dr.Is. The company went on to manufactured almost one thousands VII before the Armistice, an impressive figure at the time. Unfortunately for Germany, the aircraft had not arrived in sufficient quantity when the great offensive of March 1918 commenced. The other German Jastas, eighty of them, were equipped with Albatross D Vs, Vas, Pfalz D IIIs and D IIIas, plus the before mentioned Dr.I. In all, Germany was able to field 2047 operational aircrafts on the Western Front. Of that amount, 1680 units were deployed on the British-held sector of the front.

On the other side of the dreaded trenches, Great Britain’s Royal Flying Corps and the French Air Force were rapidly building up their respective air assets with Camels, Royal Aircraft Factory’s SE.5as and Bristol Fighters. The Sopwith Camel was one of the War’s biggest success stories. Although it possessed several destructive tendencies, in the hands of an skilled pilot it was one of the deadliest killing platforms of the conflict. There were several versions of this venerable fighter but the most prolific unit develop was the F.1. A total of 5490 Sopwith Camels were eventually produced. Many of them will find themselves on the air inventories of some foreign air forces after the war ended. Is estimated that near 3000 enemy aircrafts were downed by Camels, more than any other airplane during the four bloody years of the war. The Camel was also known for being flown out of the aircraft carriers HMS Furious and Pegasus. A few 2F.1 version were fitted with a rail mechanism that enable it to be catapulted from platforms erected on the gun turrets and forecastles of battle cruisers, heavy destroyers and/or battleships. The other main weapon on the Allied air arsenal was the RAF SE.5. The SE.5 first entered frontline service in the spring of 1917. Although less maneuverable than the French-design Nieuports and Spads, the SE.5 was faster and possessed a higher climb rate. The next version of the SE.5, the a-type was fitted with the more powerful powerplant, the Hispano-Suize 200 hp engine It entered service in June of that year. But delivery of this version was slowed by the lack of available engines. When the war ended, over 2700 SE.5s were in the inventories of England, the United States and Australia. The others fighters available to the Allies were the Bristol family of airplanes, specially the F.2B. The F.2B made its operational debuted during Allied spring offensive of 1917. Total aircraft production reached 5308 units with the last operational F.2 fighter finally retired from active duty in 1932. By March there were in France nine squadrons utilizing Camels (151 units), ten operating SE.5 (163) and six with Bristols (79). Nine more squadrons were operating Spads, S.XIII, Nieuport 17s and 27s (130). These were the units that would bear the brunt of the German might above the British section. By late February, these units were augmented by elements of several French escadrilles.

The much anticipated German offensive commenced in earnest on March 21st. Days before the ground attack began, the air war above the front was already brutal. German pilots were feverish trying to fend off Allied reconnaissance airplanes attempting to gather information on Germany’s powerful V Corps. On the wee hours of the morning, the big German guns opened fire pounding British positions all along their sector. At the same time, Camels from No. 46 Squadron began bombarding German gun emplacements positions north of Bourlon Wood. Meanwhile, No. 3 Squadron was providing close air support to the first Allied ground infiltration operations. Some elements of the No. 54 Squadron, which was assigned the task of escorting Allied reconnaissance platforms for and back, detached formation and began strafing enemy infantry units backing up the guns at Bourlon Wood in an effort to slowdown the bombardment. The next day found Camels from No. 73 and 80 Squadrons engaging the Germans, this time on the air, shooting down six enemy fighters in the process. The next two days were relative quiet on the skies above the British lines. But the calm lasted just that. On March 24th, a day that forever will be enshrined on the history books, Captain J.L. Trollope of No. 43 Squadron set a new aerial record downing six airplanes in a twenty four hour period. A feat equaled on April 12th, above the same melted ground, by another member of No. 43, Captain H.W. Woollet. But maybe the greatest feat of the air war or at least the most talked about it happened nine days later when an obscure Canadian Captain, A.R. Brown of No. 209 Squadron, flying a Camel shoot down a Fokker Dr.I near Corbie. At the controls of the Dr.I triplane was the most famous air ace of all time, Manfred von Richthofen.

Back to the ground, by early April the British High Command became aware of the massiveness of the German effort. Soon, they were sending eight more fighter/scout squadrons under the banner of the recently created Royal Air Force (RAF). The United States also rushed elements of several squadrons to aid the overstretched British. Unfortunately for the Allies, the Americans were just entering the conflict and were not ready for combat operations yet. This left France as the sole partner of the British in the air war. On its assigned sector of the front, the Aeronautique Militaire was facing a force of 367 German fighter and/or scouts planes on 18 Jastas. Despite being out number nearly two to one, the French were able to denied, at least most of the time, the Germans unrestricted access to its airspace. It was in this sector that one of the greatest French aces began an incredible run. On May 9th, a French pilot named Renée Fonk destroyed six German aircrafts, three in an amazing forty five seconds span. Fonk would go to down seventy five enemy airplanes before the ending of the war. These were the days of massive aircraft formations. On any given day, more than one hundred airplanes would be on the air at the same time. These large formations were sighted at long range enabling the other side to deploy its own assets and meet then incoming enemy on strength, thus paving the way for pilots to rack up those impresive kill ratios.

On June 14th, after months of fighting and grinding, the Germans called off their offensive effort. It seemed clear that the Germans were unable to break through the Allied lines. Fatigue and disease were depleting the Germans ranks on an alarming rate. Add to this the fact that the Americans combat divisions were beginning to arrive in France on an ever increasing numbers an equation that spelled trouble for the now overexpended Germans. The offensive of the spring 1918 would be the last major attempt by Imperial Germany to achieve victory. The air component of the fighting, although seldom mentioned, is one fill with remarkable accomplishments and scarifies. Accomplishments that would place for ever a human stamp on the often faceless aerial combat actions during The Great War.@

The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Robert Jackson, Parragon Publishing 2002

The First World War, Hew Strachan, Penguin Books 2003

Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas that Revolutionized War, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004

The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare, Editor Chris Bishop, Amber Books 2001

The German Army on the Somme 1914-1916, Jack Sheldon, Pen & Sword Books 2005

More than sixty years had passed since Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allies. In that time, witnesses, historians and researchers alike had painted a clear picture Germany’s activities during those bloody years. Much is known about the great land battles on the Eastern Front, the brave stand of a beleaguer Great Britain and the allied landings at Normandy to mention some events. As the years had passes on, numerous new facts had emerged, documents had been found, data had been de-classified paving the way to recreate obscure events that took place more than six decades ago. One of those events had to do with one of the unsolved mysteries of World War II, the flight of a German four engine aircraft from its base in northern France to within sight of the United States’ East Coast in 1944.

The story of the mysterious flight had its origins in the spring of 1942 when the then all powerful Luftwaffe requested German aircraft manufactures design prints for a long range, heavy bomber capable of reaching the US mainland from Fortress Europe. The Junkers Corporation, with its track record of well designed aircraft such as the infamous Ju-87 Stuka Dive Bomber and the Ju-88 Level-Dive Bomber platform; was the most forceful participant in the competition. The company’s Design and Development team, used the experience gained on the Ju-290 project, the so called "America Bomber", to design a completely new bomber platform. The whole 290 program was based on the concept made famous by an obscure German Air Force General, Walther Wever. In the summer of 1934, General Wever called for the immediate development of a massive four-engine, long range bomber; not to use against the US but against the Soviet Union’s industrial base located beyond the Ural Mountains. The Ju-290, known as the Ural Bomber to Luftwaffe’s officials, became Germany’s first true long range attack platform. The 290’s production run lasted only a few short years. In all, just a limited number of the 290 were ever produced by Junkers. The 290 never did made it as a true heavy bomber, but it did find a role as a long range maritime reconnaissance airplane.

During the life of the Ju-290 program, Junkers’ engineers performed several modifications to the original 290 airframe and onboard systems. The frame was lengthened, wingspan was added and two additional engines were installed to increase the aircraft’s overall horsepower output. The end result of all those modification was a nearly new airplane. This modified version was renamed the 390. The 390 was designed to carry a maximum crew load of ten men over an operational range of 6000 nautical miles (unrefueled) at speeds just above 300 mph. Two units were actually built. Both were developed as troop and equipment transport planes. Another unit, the heavy bomber version (estimated to carry a payload of 3968 pounds), was schedule to be completed by the winter of 1944-45. But by that time, nearly all of the Luftwaffe’s airframes were used as fighter platforms in an effort to beat back the vast allied air armada which was bombing the Third Reich 24/7. Nevertheless, the 390’s design was impressive enough that the Empire of Japan purchased a Junker’s license to develop its own version. It is know that one of the built samples, unit V-2, was modified directly for maritime reconnaissance missions. Once it became operational, the V-2 unit was assigned to the Kampfgeschwader Number 200, an special wing of the Luftwaffe. The 200 mission profile called for the dispatch of Abwehr infiltration agents deep behind enemy lines. Beside the V-2, the 200 operated captured Us B-17 and DC-3 aircrafts, plus a complement of five Ju-290 units.

It has been speculated that in mid 1944 , a round trip was made by a Ju-390 aircraft from a Kampfgeschwader operational base on Mont de Marsan, France to nearly fifteen nautical miles outside New York City. Could such a flight had been made? Certainly, the 390, if re-modified to achieve its maximum range capability, was capable of it. Are there official records of such endeavor? No. But the fact that there’s no official German records on the subject does not mean the flight did not took place. In fact, there’s some supporting evidence that point towards it. During the last days of the war, as the allies moved from its beachheads in northern France and the Soviets were rapidly advancing from the East, Luftwaffe’s officials, sensing imminent defeat; commenced the ritual of burning priority documents at all of its facilities. Could some of those burned documents be related to or contained information of this uncommon flight?

The first real clue regarding this alleged flight was revealed to the public in November 11th 1995 on an article by historian-researcher Dr. Kenneth Werrell on Royal Air Force Flying Review. In the article, which was based on another subject, Dr. Werrell mentioned that he possessed "information" regarding the flight of two modified Ju-390 aircrafts. The following year, the Review, on its March issue; published a letter from a British reader stating that instead of two 390s, the round trip was performed by a sole unit, thus lending credence to Dr. Werrell’s piece. In the before mentioned article, Dr. Werrell states its case on a little known story that supposedly emanated from the British intelligence services. He made references to reports of captured Luftwaffe’s intelligence officials interrogated on August 1944. Out of those interrogations, the captured officials allegedly told their handlers about the "flight". The mentioned reports, known as the General Report on Aircraft Engines and Aircraft Equipment, suggested that the two 390s did made the flight and even took pictures of Long Island. The article also made detailed references to 390’s specifications. After carefully examining the aircraft’s profile window, Werrell was able to determinate that a round trip from northern France to Newfoundland was more than feasible. But after departing Newfoundland, the 390 would had needed to travel another additional 2380 nm, which would made an unrefueled flight extremely difficult at best.

After Dr. Werrell’s article, there were a few other mentioning of this allegedly Trans Atlantic trip. The respected author William Green mentioned the incident on his 1968 book, Warplanes of the Second World War as well as on the followup effort, Warplanes of the Third Reich published in 1970. In September 1969, the Daily Telegraph of London published an article titled The Lone Bomber Raid on New York Planned by Hitler. The article center its claim around the testimony of retire Junker’s test flight pilot, Hans Pancherz. Pancherz stated that in early 1944, he flew one of the modified Ju-390 on a trial flight from Germany to Cape Town in preparations for a bombing run into the United States. The test flight when smoothly but the operation was soon canceled due to lack of resources, said Pancherz. As with other claims of the mysterious flight, no factual data could be obtained.

There’s no reliable data connecting the 390 or any other version of it to a flight into American territorial waters. In fact, no data of any kind of a German aircraft invading the US air space exist. It is entirely possible, even likely, that the before mentioned event never took place. Nevertheless, the absent of tangible data does not mean that there’s no data out there. As researchers and historians began to examining classify Soviet-era documents, it is possible that evidence of this flight could be uncover.@

Great Untold Stories of World War I, Phil Hirsch, Pyramid Books 1968

The German Air Force General Staff, Andreas Nielsen, Arno Press 1959

Luftwaffe: Birth, Life and Death of an Air Force, Alfred Price, Ballantine Books 1969

As the year 2008 comes to a close, the South Korean government will be faced with a major decision. This decision could alter the balance of power in the Korean peninsula for the next three decades. At the heart of the "cross road" is to continued the developmental stage of the country’s first independent and indigenous produced stealth fighter. In late 2000, President Kim Dea-Jung’s government concluded that after years of an intense lobbying campaign in the United States Congress for the opportunity to acquire first generation F-22 Raptors stealth fighters from the United States, an effort that proved unsuccessful; South Korean would need to develop its own program if they were to have an operational stealth aircraft by the middle of the century. On may 2001 he proceeded to order a Feasibility Study regarding the ability of the country to produce its own stealth platform. The Korean Aerospace Industry (KF) immediately began research into the platform’s characteristics and profile. This study eventually concluded that such aircraft could in fact be designed and developed in-country. The first phase of the program, the Definition Study began in the spring of 2006 and concluded in December 2006. The second part, the Feasibility Study commenced in January 2007. The task was a join effort between KF, the Korean Development Institute, the Teal Group of aerospace consultants and a government-ran think tank. The study phase was finished in February of this year. During the feasibility phase, KF and its partners visited all the major US aircraft manufactures as well as its European counterparts. The visits were intended to gather support for a transoceanic venture involving one or more of the world’s biggest aircraft design and development companies. As of today, only SAAB has demonstrated profound interest in KF effort.

The KFX concept, as outlined by the Definition Study, would be a twin engine fighter with an all internal weapons carriage mechanism similar to the one onboard the F-22. The internal carriage limited the aircraft’s cross radar signature. The KFX would have a performance envelop in the vicinity of the Boeing’s F-15K and the Lockheed Martin F-16C-D Block 52 air superiority fighters. The plane’s profile would also mimic that of the two mentioned US fighters.

As a technology "bridge" between South Korea’s Air Force current air inventory of F-15K and F-16C-D Block 52 and the new KFX, KF in partnership with Lockheed Martin, developed the FA-50 Light Attack aircraft. The FA-50 is a de facto upgraded version of the KF-Lockheed Martin join ventured TA-50 advance training airplane. The TA-50 is a light weigh and extremely maneuverable aircraft weight in at just above 6.5 metric tons (without its full weapons and fuel complement). The T-50 version took to the air for the first time on August 20th 2002 and became operational in February 2005. Over one hundred units of the T-50 had been delivered to the South Korean AF.

But South Korean "bridge" is getting closer to cross. The Korean government estimated that the $ 12 billion program should produce a workable air vehicle by 2017 with the first units entering frontal service four years later. So, if the decision to move forward is made, South Korea could very well field the forth stealth tactical squadron (Russia, Great Britain and France are working on their own stealth platforms) in the world. A truly remarkable achievement by any standards.@

In the historied life of the United States Air Force there’s had been a few officers who had stood up. A few, whom their contribution had shaken the very foundation of the service they represent. Much of them are relative household figures. Names such as Hap Arnold or LeMay are widely known in circles outside the military establishment. But for every Arnold or LeMay, there’s a Foulois. A brilliant and innovating pioneer, what Foulois lack in name recognition, he had in the admiration of the service he dedicated his life to improve.

Benjamin Delahauf Foulois was born on a small Connecticut town on the 9th of December 1879. He attended public school until he began his "pluming" career along with his father. He quickly realized that pluming was not in his future an in 1898, young Foulois enlisted in the First US Volunteer Engineers. He went on to serve in Puerto Rico during the Spanish-American conflict. He took himself out of the volunteer corps and reenlisted on the regular Army the following year. Later on 1899, he saw combat action on the Philippines where he was assigned to mapping the island of Mindanao. After the Philippines, Foulois went on to attend the prestigious Army’s Infantry/Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In the mid 1900s he participated in operations with the Army of Cuban Pacification. After his service there, he enrolled at the Signal School. It was at the school that he first felt in love with the idea of flying. He commenced to study technics and technical data relating to this new and exiting field. Following his stay there, young Foulois was assigned to the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in Washington, DC.

By the mid 1909, the now second lieutenant, piloted the Army’s first operational ready dirigible. He was also one of the first officers to be introduced to Orville and Wilbur Wright’s Flyer. In fact, he was Orville’s passenger during the Flyer’s last test flight at Fort Myer flying at nearly forty miles per hour. He had the distinction of being the only US Army pilot active between 1909 trough 1911. In 1910, he took the Army’s only available airplane, Signal Aeroplane No I, to San Francisco where he taught himself to fly, mostly by crashing. He corresponded frequently with the by now famous Brothers stating his flying experiences and suggestions. By 1914, Foulois, now a captain, took overall command of the Army’s first fully operational flying squadron, the First Aero Squadron based at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. The new squadron was equipped with the newest Curtiss plane, the JN2 biplane. They first saw action during General John J. Perishing’s Mexican Punitive Expedition in March 1916. Although the overall perception of the aerial component of the Expedition, was that of a failure, Foulois and his team did gained value experience, specialty on the logistic aspect of aviation.

The next conflict America would enter, the Great War, found the now major Foulois in command of the Joint Army and navy Technical Committee. It was in this post that the young major first learned how to craft and manage a military procurement budget. The office he headed dealt with the development of the aircraft as a military weapons platform on a large scale. There, Foulois prepared a detailed $ 640 million budget, an massive figure at the time; which eventually passed both houses of congress. A major achievement and one that would give him much satisfaction during the rest of his life. During the dreadful years of the War to end All Wars, Foulois was temporarily promoted to Brigadier General and proceeded to serve in several aviation post across Europe. He first was named Chief of Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces, later on he was reassigned to Assistant Chief of the Air Service, Service Supply Division where he put in play the input gather during the Mexican Expedition. He even helped craft some of the air aspects of the Treaty of Versailles.

After his war tour, Foulois returned to Fort Leavenworth with the now permanent rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He was briefly assigned base commander of the Mitchel Field in New York. In 1927, Foulois was promoted once again, this time to brigadier general and appointed Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. It was there that the enigmatic Foulois would make an enduring mark. During the May 1931 Air Coast Defense Exercises, Foulois employed all of the Air Corps’ airborne assets in a series of logistic and tactical trials that provided the ground work for the Army Air Corps’ World War II strategy. The success of the exercises earned him another star for his uniform and the promotion to the coveted Chief of the Air Corps post. He once again, had the distinction of being a trailblazer because he was the first Chief who was actually a combat aviator. While acting as Chief, Foulois re-organized the curriculum of the Air Corps’ Tactical School as well laying the groundwork for the eventual establishment of an independent office dedicated to tactical and strategic thinking. The office would be later known as the General Headquarters Air Force. He also drove the Air Corps to expend more time and effort in the development and eventual deployment of advance air platforms. The XB-15 and B-17 programs were a direct result of this effort.

As his star was rising, an incident occurred that dampened Foulois’ reputation for years. In the winter of 1933-34, contract difficulties caused the nation’s air mail delivery service to be suspended. Immediately, Foulois offered the government his Air Corps. As the spring moved in, the Army Air Corps began to assume regular mail delivery duties, but the Corps, not trained for this sort of profile, began to crumble under the stress of the operation. Regular casualties began to mount. During the spring’s months, 66 air crashed occurred, mostly due to poor weather patterns, insufficient mission training and the introduction of nigh flying, killing twelve men and injuring fifty more. As the Corps began to adjust to the realities of in-country flying, the crashes and for that matter, casualties commenced to drop. By the summer, the Corps mail operations ran almost without incidents. Nevertheless, the whole affair became a public humiliation for the Corps and its leader. The incident, which would be known as the Mail Fiasco tarnished the Air Corps leadership image with the public for a generation.

Exhausted, Foulois finally retire from the Army Air Force on January 1st 1936, following thirty seven years of frontline service. In 1956 he became the president of the Air Force Historical Foundation. A post he would serve until 1965. Two years later, on April 25th 1967, Benjamin Foulois passed away. The passing of this great visionary and pioneer was remembered by the Air Force in a quiet ceremony. Today, Foulois’ vision remains the core of the US Air Force’s main logistic strategy. A tribute by itself to the vision Foulois inserted into the Air Corps in the early 1930s.@

The Robert Mayo’s Composite Aircraft was one of many attempts performed in the early 1930s to provide long range mail delivery service. As strange as the composite concept looks now, the Mayo did validated the concept by recording several aviation milestones. The more impressive one was a then record 5984 mile, unrefueled trip. It commenced on the Dundee, Scotland and it terminated on the banks of the Orange River in South Africa. A remarkable achievement on that or any era. His record, for a seaplane, still exist today. The Mayo idea had its origins with the development of the Imperial Airways’ Empire flying-boat. The Empire proved that transatlantic crossing could be achieve by a large enough aircraft with massive fuel storage facilities. But as successful as the Empire program was, it did not produce a reliable cargo platform. Nearly all of the available space inside the massive aircraft was utilized as fuel depots. Entered Robert Mayo. He promptly submerged itself on the Empire research data available to him. Armed with that collected information, Mayo suggested that a small, heavy loaded floatplane could be carry on the "back" of a larger "mother ship" airplane the released when the mother ship reached its maximum operational range. The concept cached the eyes of the Short Brothers whom decided to produce a prototype for test trials. As any composite concept, the Mayo had two separate aircraft: the Maia and Mercury.

The "mother ship" aircraft was called the Mayo. Its airframe was closely based on the successful Empire flying-boat design. The composite concept is based on two separate aircraft which are attached during take off. The base aircraft of the Mayo was the Maia or S.20 (G-ADHK) as it was designated. The Maia’s airframe had smooth lines and a two-step flying-boat hull. The Maia frame had a length of 85 feet with a span of 114 feet. Total wing area was 1748 square feet. The "mother" aircraft in this Composite concept weight in 24715 pounds empty and 3754 pound fully loaded. The aircraft was powered by four massive, 919 horse powered Bristol Pegasus XC radial piston engines which each turned a three bladed propeller mechanism. These engines gave the Maia a top speed of 200 miles per hour. Unrefueled operational range was 843 miles. The aircraft had a serviceable ceiling of 20000 feet. As impressive as this aircraft’s specifications were, its main purpose was to fly a designated distance before launching the other component of the concept: the Mercury.

The other aircraft, the Mercury, designated S.21 (G-ADHJ) was a newly designed, long range floatplane with sleek frame lines. Its fuselage measured 51 feet in length with awing span of 73 feet. Total wing area was 611 square feet. The backbone of the aircraft was its pylons which needed to hold the Mercury to the mother ship while takeoff operations. The aircraft was propelled by four Napier Rapier H piston engines capable of generating 340 hp. Designated as the S.21, the Mercury could achieve speeds up to 210 mph. But the real important feature of the Mercury was its operational range which was an impressive 3800 miles. The Mercury weight it at 10150 pounds while empty. Fully loaded the floatplane weigh in at 15466 pounds. Of this weight, 1000 pound were assigned to cargo. An impressive figure for such a relative small aircraft. Both aircraft were able to takeoff with a total combine weight of 27676 pounds. With all of their combine engines running, the Mayo produced a very respectable 5040 hp output. The Mercury floatplane was operated by a pilot and co-pilot. Meanwhile, the Maia was crewed by five officers. A pilot, co-pilot, a navigator, a radio operator and a reserve pilot.

On February 6th 1939, the Mayo successfully launched the Mercury which went on to complete its first commercial, non stop flight to Montreal. The complete trip lasted just over twenty hours. The Mayo made several more successful flights, including the record setter trip to South Africa. The program seemed to be up and running when the clouds of war began to appear over Europe in the late 1930s. The Short Brothers abandoned the program after Germany invaded Poland. It is wildly rumored hat the Mayo Composite might had inspire the German Mistel program. The Maia was destroyed in Mayo 1941 in an enemy bomb raid. The Mercury survived the war but was dismantled soon after. A concept that looked promising was un-ceremonially terminated. It is speculative what would had happen to the Mayo if faith had not intervene.@

Designed by the great Ernst Heinkel, the Albatros B.II became the first in a long and distinguishes line of Heinkel aircraft designs that reached all the way from the beginning of the Great War and ended in the early stages of the Cold War. The B.II, first designed and built in early 1914, went on to cement the name of Albatros Flugzeugwerke GmbH as a leader in the aircraft development industry. The B.II was developing primarily to serve as an observation platform, relaying enemy troop concentrations and movement to German commanders in the Western Front. As was the custom on those early days of aviation, the Albatros was not fitted with any defensive armament. Its mission profile was strictly observation.

 

Specifications

 

Fuselage Length	25’-0”
Fuselage Height	10’-4”
Wing Span	42’-0”
Maximum Take-off Weight	2,361lb
Power Plant	One Mercedes 6-cylinder liquid cooled, in-line engine generating 100hp
Maximum Speed	66 mph
Operational Range	101 miles
Service Ceiling	9,840ft

 

The aircraft was manned by a crew of two. They were seated in a front-rear configuration atop of the aircraft’s fuselage. The two wings structures were canvas covered attached to each other with wooden struts. A fix, two wheeled, under carried was placed below the engine with a third wheel at the lower-rear end of the airframe. The Albatros B.II first entered front line service in late 1914 and saw action with the Imperial German Corps until retired from action in the autumn of 1915. Thru its service history, the B.II was a fixture over the skies of Northern France. Just the sight of the B.II caused Allied soldiers to wonder when the next German ground offensive would come. By the middle of 1915, the B.II, by now obsolete, was relegated to trainer duty. When the war ended in 1918, the remained operational B.II was ceded to the infant Royal Swedish Air Force where the aircraft regained operational status as a dual control trainer plane. The Albatros B.II was finally removed from service in November 1919.@